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How should countries líke Poland or the USSR move [owards price
flexibility, gradually or in a"big bang"? Why is it that Governments
committed to eventual price flexibility so often seem to be unable to let
go of "temporary" controls? How can one explaín that after price increases
early in a program of price controls, one often sees output rise while at
the same tíme shortages seem to increase also7 This paper argues that
intertemporal speculation, hoarding and the political economy of price
reform go a long way towards explainíng all these puzzles. We show that the
interaction between shortages and polítical wlnerability of reformist
governments to early perceptions of failure make for a stzong argument
eFainst gradualism in the decontrol of prices.
I am índebted to Max Corden, Alex Cukierman, Antonio Estache, Arye
Hillman, Santiago Levy, Dani Rodrik, Lars Svensson and seminar participants
at the World Bank, the IMF and Princeton and Pennsylvania State
Universíties for helpful coimnents. The views expressed ín [his paper do not
necessarily coincide with those of the institutions I am affilíated with.1
1 Introduction
How should prices be decontrolled, slowly or in a big bang? Why ís it
that Governments committed to eventual price flexibility so often seem to
be unable to let go of "temporary" controls? How can one explain that after
price increases early ín a program of price controls, one often sees output
rise while at the same time shortages seem to increase also (Bresser
(1987), Ortiz (1990))? This paper argues that intertemporal speculation,
hoarding and the political economy of price reform go a long way towards
explainíng all these puzzles. We show that the interaction between
shortages and political wlnerability of reformist governments to early
perceptions of failure make for a strong argument a ns gradualism in the
decontrol of prices.
Price controls have a long and dísreputable history. Direct controls
have often been used as substitutes for, rather than complements of,
regular fiscal and monetary restraint; they thus ended up suppressing
rather than curing ínflatíon. More recently they have seen more
sophisticated use, as transitional devices in a series of stabilization
programs ttiat also encompassed orthodox components (Mexíco and Israel are
successful examples).
The literature on price controls is thin. The microeconomic case
against them is unassailable, so the literature that exists focuses on the
question of whether their use can be justified on macroeconomic grounds.
Dornbusch and Simonsen (1987) point to private coordination failures as a
rationale for price controls after a tightening of monetary policy. Persson
and van Wijnbergen (1989) show that the use of price controls can lower the
cost to a government with credibility problems of signaling its true type,
and thus the transitional unemployment costs of stabilization programs (cf
also van Wijnbergen (1989) for arguments along this line). Calvo (1988)
points out that credibility problems present a prima facíe case for policy
interventíon. Mistaken beliefs cause a wedge between marginal rates of
substítution and true rates of transformation and thus present a
distortíon.
Thís paper abstracts from the questíon of why price controls are2
used. Instead it asks a different question, one that is perhaps of greater
practical importance. Assume that, for reasons good or bad, price controls
are in place; how should they be terminated? How to escape from a period of
controls? Both the coordination failure and the signaling approach suggest
at most temporary use of controls, ín order to minimize output losses on
the transition path towards lower inflation. Should in such an approach
controls be abolished "cold turkey" or can a case be made for gradualism?
The issue is in fact of much wíder importance; all of Eastern Europe has
been living under price controls, imposed for a very different reason. How
should countries líke Poland or the USSR move towards price flexibility,
gradually or ln a"big bang"7
Two factors complicate the issue and are at the core of this paper.
In many cases price controls focus on commodities like basic graíns,
commodities that are eminently storable and can thus be used in
intertemporal speculation. This seems to have been acute in for example
Brazil, where in 1985 a series of price controls were introduced whlch
where very much seen as temporary. Bresser (1987), who was the finance
minister at the time, states: "There was shortage of inerchandise in stores
at the (same] time that stocks were accummulating in the factories".
The second factor is that opposition to rapid dísmantling of controls
is often based on claims of low supply response, and greatly bolstered if a
strong supply response indeed faíls to materialise. This is especially
relevant in places líke Eastern Europe, where experience with price
responsive markets is limited. A less benign argument also lends support to
a link between low supply response and opposition to relaxing controls.
Shortages create rents, and rents will attract lobbyists in favor of
continuation of those policies that create the rents.
We show the difficulties that these two factors create for gradual
decontrol of prices. We endogenise the probability of a collapse of the
reform program along the lines of the recent literature about the impact of
political considerations on economic policy (see in particular Alesina and
Cukierman (1990)) and show that such endogeneity in the presence of
intertemporal speculation leads to a strong case a a g inst gradualism. Our
core result is a forceful argument against gradual decontrol: we show that3
the smaller the initial price increase is, the lower the observed supply
elasticity and the greater the probabilíty Chat the program of reform will
in fact be abandoned.
2 Intertemporal Speculatíon and the Supply Response to Gradual
Price Decontrol.
2.1 The Basic Model
Assume a aimple traded~non-traded disaggregation, with the country a
price taker in international markets. The traded sector uses labor only,
and at constant returns to scale; thus tha real wage is fixed in terms of
traded goods at say w. In the non-traded sector, production technology
exhibits decreasing returns to scale, for example because there is a fixed
factor in the background (say land); unit costs are therefore an increasing
function of output. There are a large number of producers in the NT sector,
so that each individual producer has a negligible impact on the price, or,
in the case of operative price controls, on aggregate shortages. Producer
i's output today equals Yi, and output tomorrow yi. Labor is the only
varíable factor. Each producer faces exactly the same technology and
prices; there is complete symmetry. The cost function for current (future)
production equals C (c):
C a C(w, Y!), C„ ) 0
c ~ c(w,Yi), c„ ) o
(1)
Capital letters represeiit first period variahlea and lower case letters
second period varíables. Decreasing returns imply increasing marginal
costs, therefore CYY and cY~ are both strictly positive. We will at one
point ín Sectíon 5 need an additional assumptíon on C(C~ ~ 0). Total
output Y is the summation over all i of individual producers' output Yi.
Output produced today (Y1) can be sold today or stored for sale
tomorrow. Sínce there are only two períods, output produced tomorrow (yl)
will be fully sold tomorrow. There is a storage technology ~: goods put in4
storage today, Si, are related to goods available from storage in period 2
according to the technology m:
s~ -~(S~); p(0) - 0, 0 t~~ s 1 (2)
If ~'- 1, the only cost of holding inventories S far speculative reasons ís
the interest income foregone on the íncome that selling in period one would
have yielded. With ~' G 1, part of goods stored goes to waste due to
factors such as spoilage, pests and so on. Alternatively, there míght be
positive direct marginal costs of storage (direct as opposed to the
indirect, opportunity cost of interest foregone on the money tíed up in
goods in storage).
The market clearing price in períod 1(2) is P' (p'). Controls are
ímposed in the non-traded sector only. Before the announcement of
decontrol, prices were set at Po - po G P', p'. A cold turkey approach to
decontrol implies the announcement of immediate transition to market prices
in both periods. Gradual decontrol implies a price increase in period 1
that falls short of going to market prices: P~ t P~; while a full move to
market prices is announced for period two.
Call p the probability that the decontrol program will be abandoned.
We assume that when the program of gradual decontrol ís abandoned ín period
2, the controls will be kept at their level of period 1, i.e. in that case
pi - P`. A collapse of the cold turkey decontrol program does not have such
an obvious default posítion; we assume that if the cold turkey program
collapses, prices in períod two wíll be set at the pre-decontrol level
po.i~ In the next section we will derive p endogenously by linking it to
aggregate shortages. But there are too many producers and consumers for any
índividual agent to believe he or she can influence aggregate quantities.
Thus both producers and consumers take p as given, although they are aware
of the link between aggregate quantítíes and p.
1 One could alternatívely have assumed the same level as obtains under
a collapse of the gradual regime; this would lead to the same results.5
Producers-
Consider the producer problem when a gradual decontrol program has
been announced. The producer has to choose today's output Y and level of
inventories S before knowing whether the Government will implement its
announcements for period two or whether the program will collapse
halfway.2 However second period output can be chosen after period 2
Government policies have become clear. The second period production
decision is thus a simple static optimization problem:
NO CoZ2dpse: MaxY. p' (Y'.O (S) ) -C(w,Y')
Collapse: Maxra P~(y~~~(S)) -c(w,y~)
where S is inherited from period one and thus not a decision variable
anymore. This leads to the standard first order conditions:
cy(Y~) ' P~; cy(Y~) ~ Py




Clearly, cr(Ssy) ~ S~p unless cnr - 0.
In períod one producers have to choose output Y and the part of
output put in storage S, knowing that in period two they will follow the
rules laid out ín equ. (4). This leads to the following maximization
problem:
Maxr.~ (Y - S)Pg - C(w,17 t 88((Y' P(S))D - c(w,Y))
subject to 0 s S s Y
(6)
b is the market discount factor: b- 1~(ltr) with r the real interest rate
in terms of traded goods. ó is exogenous as we assume open international
z Subscripts i are omitted where that can be done without causing
confusion.6
capital markets. S ís the expectations operator. Sp equals:
Sy p- (1 - p) pó i p Py; Gzadual Decontzol
gcc P z (1 - P) p~~ r ppo~ Cold 7Lrkey
(7)
In general p~i r p~~c for reasons explained below. We will however omit the
subacript where this does not lead to confusion.
The Lagrangean problem associated with (6) equals:
Minl.r ~Xr.a L ~ Py(Y - S) -C(w. Y1 i 88~ (P(Y ~ ~ (S) ) -c(w,Y) )
r xSt~t(Y-S)
with associated first order conditions:
Cr`pa'W
-Py . ó v~ 8y P a L- y. 0
(B)
(9)
The first order conditions in equ. (9) indicate that output will be
increased until its marginal cost equals the value of an extra unít of
output. This latter value equals the price plus, in the first period only,
any additional shadow price picked up by inventories if they are
constrained by the fact that additions to ínventories cannot exceed total
production (l.e. Y~ Ps when y~ 0). As to inventories, they are increased
or decreased so as to equalise the value of an extra unit of output today
(P~) with the discounted value of an extra unit tomorrow (6~'Sip). Of
course if inventories hit a corner solution (0 or Y), that equality cannot
be brought about and either a or {~ becomes positive, driving a wedge
between the marginal benefit of an extra sale today versus an extra sale
tomorrow. Clearly, hígher prices lead to higher output in each period:
dY - Cri ~ 0; ~- ' cry(Y~) ~ 0; dY` - cyy(Y~) ~ 0 (10) dPa dP9 ~a
The analysis for "cold turkey" decontrol follows along similar lines; just
replace Ps by P~ and F~` by 8'~t throughout.7
Consumers:
The consumer chooses between Traded (T) and Non-Traded (NT) goods
each perlod, and allocates expenditure over today and tomorrow. Aggrogatc
consumer behavior is approximated~ by an expendíture function; in the
absence of rationing, this function gives the minimum level of expenditure
to reach welfare level U at the given intra- and inter-temporal relative
price structure:
E~ M171 P'A" a A t t b(y'à" t d t)
subject to: U((A",~Ar),(a",at)) z U
L E(II(P'.1).btc(P'.1),(n
A1 (al) is real consumption of good i in period one (two). The derivatives
of E with respect to príces yield the Hicksian demand functions (Dixit and
Norman (1960)). II and x are exact price indices for current and future
consumption corresponding to the utility structure underlying (8). We
assume that II and x are compatible with the assumptíon of unchanging static
preferences accross periods.
However, when príce controls are binding, conswner demand is ~iot met
at quoted prices. In that case we can define v rtua prices, which are the
prices at which consumers would willingly consume the rations allocated to
them (see Neary and Roberts (1980)):
dE(II(Py,1),..) "




3 This is an approximation for two reasons. First, as introduced below,
consumers have heterogenous expectations about supply elasticities and hence,
presumably, about future prices. This introduces an aggregation error. Second,
one should use the certainty equivalent of the second period price rather than
the expected value. Since the índirect utility function is convex in prices,
the two are not the same. The difference cannot be signed a príori, however,
and will be ignored.8
where Pye is the ration allocated in period 1 and a~h the ratíon allocated
in period 2. Under the preference structure assumed sofar, it is easy to
show that:
Py t P' t P~ : po t p' t p~ (13)
Consumer behavior is furthermore restricted by the intertemporal budget
constraint consumers face. In the case of gradualism, that constraínt
equals:
YT i Py (Y - S) - C r b( óy P(Y ~ s) - c) ~ E (14)
while under a cold turkey approach we get:
YT t P' (Y - S) - C. b (8~ P(Y . s) - c) ~ E (15)
Yr is output in the traded good sector. The welfare gain due to a small
increase ín the ration is proportíonal to the wedge between controlled and
virtual prices (Neary and Roberts (1980)):
Eo ~ ~ ` (P~ - Py)
R
(16)
For given collapse probability p(which will be endogenized in the
next section), the model is closed in each period by either a market
clearing equation for the NT market in case market prices prevail, or by an
equation defining virtual prices if price controls are operating and
binding. The latter case is described by equations ( 12). Without price
controla, market prices follow from NT goods market equilíbrium:




If controls operate in one period, and market príces in the other, the
appropriate sub-equations from (9) and (14) need to be selected.
2.2 Aggregate Supply Response, Hoarding and Gradualism.
To bring out the structure of the problem, consider first a
simplified setup, without direct costs of inventory holding: m ' - 1, and
thus s- S. Assume there is enough curvature ín the cost functions to
always guarantee positive output in each period. But for positive Y it ís
clear that a and W cannot be posítive simultaneously: If Y~ 0, S cannot
simultaneously be at the 0 and Y boundary. Consider first the case where
a ~ 0, p- 0. The first order conditions then simplify to:




Sínce a~ 0, there is no ínventory holdíng: S - 0, and all output is
(18A)
(18B)
produced for sale in the period in which it is actually produced.Lo




~i?~ po ~7Q '
Collapse Probability
The output levels clearly depend on the actual or (for period two)
the expected level of prices. all the output level produced for initial
price Pi and in the absence of any production for inventories Y~. Because
Cri ~ 0, P~ 1 Po implies Yi ~ Yo. Thus , if a~ 0, there is a positíve
supply response to the program ( Figure 1). ( 18B) indícates under which
circumstances this will in fact happen: the expected rate of price increase
has to be lower than the nominal rate of interest. In case of full
credibility ( p - 0), this implies that relative price of the controlled
commodity cannot rise faster than the world real rate of interest.
Consider next the case where a - 0, y ~ 0. In this case the first
order conditíons become:
Cr .pp . p; cy ~ ó9 p (19A)
b~y p ~
1. i~ ) 1
Py Py
(19B)
In this case, output in period one is in fact higher, from (19A), because
CYy ~ 0 and y 1 0. Compare (18A) and (19A) and note that first períod11
marginal revenue in (19A) is higher with y~ 0, leading to higher output ín
this case. But, in a rather extreme reversal from the a 1 0 case, all of it
is stored for the future period: y~ 0~ S- Y. So although output is in
fact hlgher, supply actually reaching the market has completely dried up;
all output is hoarded for sale in the future, when pricea will be even
higher. The reason for it becomes clear from (18B): prices are actually
rising faster than the rate of interest (y ~ 0), thus making storage for
future sale more profitable than producing for the current market. '~
Since Se p depends on the collapse probability p, that collapse
probability has an important impact on which regime will actually prevail.
Figure 1 ties the different solutions together as a function of p. It shows
the aggregate supply response, for gíven first period price increase, as a
function of the credibility of the program. A higher p indicates a ower
credibility of the program. The diagram indicates that, as p increases, it
reaches a threshold level po at which the expected rate of price increase
falls to below the rate of interest as the likelihood that the second stage
will not be ímplemented goes up. Above that threshold, the íncentive for
hoarding falls away and, while output does not increase, the share of it
that reaches the market does. With very low credíbilíty (very high p),
there is no reason to produce for inventories, which leads to a smaller
increase in output but everything is delivered to today's market. Thus the
observed supply response is positive. However, in the opposite case, with
high probability of success (low p), the likelihood of high future prices
is high, and with it the incentive to hoard. Therefore in the case of a low
p, the obscrved supply elastícity is in fact negatíve.
The case with positive physical costs of storage, ~' ~ 1 ís probably
more realistíc. We assume that there are positive marginal costs to
' In the borderline case where prices rise at exactly the rate of
interest, a-p-0, and pruducers are indífferent between sellíng today versus
hoardíng. It is natural to assume that in that case the demand side will
determíne the outcome, i.e. no hoarding, since consumers are rationed ín
period 1. This cnso is much more important ín the case analyzed below, wíth
direct cosls ol holdíng íuventories.12
storage, and that they increase with the amount stored. It becomes harder
and harder to protect supplies from animals, pests, spoilage or theft as
they become bulkier. Formally, these assumptions imply ~' G 1 and ~" t 0.
This leads to the first order conditions listed in equs. ( 20A-B):
Cr ~ Py . p; cy(Y~) ~ P~; cyíYc~ ` Ps (20A)
8~~goP . ~ . 1
Py Py
(20B)
Fig.2 below helps in understanding the solution to the set of
equations liated in (20A-B). The fígure shows the rate of return on holding
inventories, S-(b~'Si p)~P~), as a function of S, Che amount of
inventories held.13
Contrary to the case we just analyzed (~'-1), S now does have an
impact on this rate because changes in S change marginal storage costs m'.
As the amount stored increases, margínal storage costs rise. Therefore the
rate of return on holding inventories falls with the amount stored (the
downward sloping curve in Fíg.2). Call the intersection between this curve
and the horizontal line at 1 S'. At that poínt the rate of return on
inventories equals the rate of interest. Note that contrary to the ~'-1
case, this equality only holds at S'; consequently producers want to hold
S', rather than being indifferent between selling today or tomorrow as was
the case for a-~-0, m' - 1.
Moreover, (20B) implies that ín the region to the left of S~, labeled
"A" in fig. 2, p~ 0 and a- 0. Analogously, to the right of S', in the
regíon labeled "B", a 1 0 and {~ - 0. Therefore the solution to equations
(20A-B) cannot be in regíons A and B: N~ 0 implies S- Y~ S', which is
inconsistent with being in A to begin with. A similar argument rules out
region B. Thus, if there is an intersection at all, the solutíon to (20A-B)
is a-y-0, S- S', Y-Ye.
If ttiere is no intersection for any S e(0, Y`), one of the corner
solutíons will obtain. If for all possible values of S, f~ 1, there will
never be any inventory holdíng since prices are expected to rise too
slowly. Thís is only relevant for price reforms from a relatively
undistorted starting point. We will therefore not consíder thís case
anyfurther. At the other extreme ís the case where for all feasible S, f
remains above 1. T'his means that prices are expected to ríse rapidly at any
level of inventories, more than enough to offset high marginal storage
costs. In that case all current outputs~ will be hoarded.
Consider S' and the a-p-o case in more detaíl (Figure 3).
Differentiating (206) indicates the relation between the optimal level of
hoarding S~ and the collapse probability p:
5 Whích will exceed YB sínce CY - P~ t y~ P~.14
~I r~(P~ - pp) ~ 0 dG ~á.i- 4iig~ P (21)
If there ís a collapse, anticipated capital gaíns will not materialize,
because in that case controls remain in place. Therefore a greater
likelihood of collapse implies a greater likelihood of no price rise
between today and tomorrow, and thua reduced hoarding incentives. On the
other hand, reduced storage (lower S) reduces margínal storage costs and
thus increases the return on ínventory holdíng. As credibility declínes and
p moves up, hoardíng declines and thus the observed supply response Y- S
actually increases. This is indicated by the upward sloping line labeled HS
(for Hoarding Schedule) in Figure 3. In fact if credibility is low enough,
a corner solution may be reached where no intertemporal apeculation ís
profitable and the corner solution associated with a 1 0 is reached (the
flat segment in Figure 3). This is clearly the case for the extreme outcome
of no credibility at all (p - 1). At p- 1, prices are in fact not expected
to ríse at all, there will thereforc not be any hoardíng and the HS curve
intersects the p- 1 nxls at Yi.
Compare next two different stabllization programs, each "gradualist":
príces are moved partially in period one but fully liberalized in period
two. However, one program is more gradualist than the other in that the
initial price response is smaller ("Low Ps" versus "High P~"). First of
all, a higher first períod control price P~ increases the optimal level of
first period output for given incentives to hoard (cf equ. (9)). This means
that the flat part of the hoarding schedule (where hoarding is zero and




Also, higher inítial prices mean lower percentage capital gains once the
market is liberalízed. Thus the incentive to hoard will, ceteris paribus,15
decline:
dS I ~ P ' gy PIPy) ~
p C 0 ug dPy I
cIC ~ a p
Therefore:
o' ` ol - áP I ~ e,
~ OcI[
(23)
~2 ~ ~1 means that the curved segment of the diagram in fact shífts up more
than the flat part. This implíes that the point where hoarding becomes
unprofitable moves to the left ( cf Fig. 3, move from the "low P~" schedule
NS towards the "high Pg" schedule HS'). Also, with a higher Pi, there will
be less first period rationing, and hence less spíll over into the market
for second period hame goods (note that Fpp ~ 0). Thus p' will be lower,
further reducing hoarding incentives; hence the area where a- 0 shifts
further to the left. The main result is that, for given collapse16
probability p, bolder decontrol programs (larger initial price increases)
will lead to less hoarding, larger increases in output, and as a
consequence, much less problema with shortages.
However, this result is conditional on a given collapse probability
and thus carries little weight as long as we do not know what happens to
the collapse probability in response to a bolder program of price
decontrol. Thís question is taken up ín the next section.
3 Shortages and the Probabílity of Reform Failure
The analysis presented sofar is incomplete in that the probabílity of
collapse, which features both in consumers' savings and producers' hoarding
decisions, was kept exogenous. In most of the literature, credibility of
stabilízation programs or more generally of policy reforms is kept
exogenous (Calvo (1988), van Wijnbergen (1989)). But assuming exogenous
credibillty clearly limits the usefulness of the analysís severely, since
the ímpact of any polícy will most likely depend on whether it is goíng to
be sustained or not.
Persson and van Wijnbergen (1989) and Vickers (1988) use the
signaling equilibrium approach, which goes to the other extreme by only
considering polícies that from an íncentive compatíbilíty view point are
fully credible. In their approach a corner solution ís reached, in a
separating equilibrium: full credibility or none at all. However, the
Mexican experience with extreme fiscal orthodoxy backed up in a later stage
by more "heterodox" elements (cf Ortíz (1990)) suggests that the clean
solution promised by their separating equilibría is in fact hard to
achieve.
In pioneering papers, Ize and Ortiz (1987) and Dornbusch (1989)
attempted to endogenise credibility in a macroeconomic settíng, linking
credibility to various macroeconomic variables. The equílibria they
consider have many prima facie plausible features. But their reliance on
what is basically an arbitrary relation between program credibility and
macro variables makes one wonder whether that relation itself, for all its
empirical plausibility, would not be affected by economíc policy. Thus a17
more rigorous approach to the determination of program credibilíty is
called for, an approach that maintains the same theoretical rigor as the
signaling equilibríum approach, but allows for some of the fuzziness that
plagues actual policy making.
In this paper we break new ground by drawing on recent innovations ín
the analysis of the impact of political considerations on economic policy
to find a solutíon to this problem. 6~
Intuition suggests a link between aggregate shortages in the early
stages of the program and the likelihood that the program will be abandoned
halfway (i.e. that controls, contrary to announcements, are not lifted ín
period two). There are of course many ways ín which a reform program can be
aborted. Government offícials may be bribed by lobbyists seeking the rents
created by the price controls. A Balance of Payments crisis may make it
impossible to continue the exchange rate policy on which many such de-
control programs are built. The political opposition may gather strength if
the inítial results are disappointing. Which specific mechanísm is most
relevant probably depends on the circumstances in the country under
consíderation; but one would expect símílar results for each. In this
paper, we focus on political opposition, arguably the most relevant one if
one has Eastern Europe in mind.
At the begínning of períod 2, before the Covernment can implement the
second stage of its reform program, we assume it has to face a vote whích
will determine whether it can continue or whether the opposition takes
over. Alternatively, in a less democratic interpretation, the Government
may be forced to change its course of economic policy if unrest due to
economic díscontent becomes too widespread. all the probability that this
happens p. We showed ín the previous section that p has a substantial
impact on first period hoarding behavior. The key question then is, what
determines pT
Assume that voters are divíded in their assessment of whether free
markets will indeed outperform a controlled economy ín supplying goods to
6 See Cukierman and Liviatan (1990) for an interesting, although very
different, approach to the same problem.18
consumers. Price rises will on the one hand have a negative impact effect
proportional to the ration received. On the other hand, they will be
beneficial to the extent they raise supply, since at the margin, marginal
utility of one extra unit (P„) exceeds the posted price Po (see the
appendix for a formal expression). We parametrise the divergence of views
by assuming that voters have different priors on the aggregate supply
elasticity in the NT sector (The traded sector is not really an issue since
there what is not supplied domestically can be imported).~~ The opposition
argues that supply elasticities are too low to expect any benefits from
price decontrol.
There is a continuum of voters, indexed by s. For analytical
convenience, we assume that each voter's prior can be represented by the
normal~inverted-P distribution commonly used in Bayesian analysis. This
distribution retains its structure as new data are used to update it (i.e.
it is a natural conjugate distríbution).
Define o-(d(Y-S)~dP)s~, and call the prior and posterior density
function of voter s pPr(o(s)) and pPo(a(s)) respectively. nPr is the prior's
mean and aPo the mean of the posterior distribution. Voters enter period
one with a particular príor distríbution, formed in periods before, and
obaerve output response ín period one. They use that information to update
theiz prior into the posterior dístributíon used to form (rational)
expectations about the likely election outcome in period 2. Voters are
ranked in ascending order of ap~. Voters for whom Q(s) ~ 0 vote in favor of
the Government, and voters for whom a(s) 5 0 vote against it. 9~
~ Thís supply elasticity is an attribute of producer behavior; producers
can thus reasonably be expected to know this parameter exactly. We assume that
there ara many more consumers than producers and tha[ thís point can Cherefore
be ígnored.
s Purely presentational reasons make it more convenient to define o as
d(Y-S)~dP ínstead of as the elasticity (P~(Y-S))~d(Y-S)~dP. For lack of a
better word we will nevertheless occasíonally use the word elasticíty when we
have a in mínd, although of course d(Y-S)~dP is not an elasticity.
9 Any other cut-off level leads to similar results as long as the supply
response can exceed or fall short of the cut-off level chosen. The appendix
indicates how a cut-off level can be derived directly from voter welfare
maximízation.19
There ís straight majority voting, and, as we will show below,
voters' preferences over the various alternatives are single peaked.
Therefore the median voter, sm, casts the decisive vote.lo~ Votera know
their own view on the supply elasticity a and form rational expectations
about economic aggregates, but they do not know every other voter's views.
In partícular they do not know the magnitude of a(se), the median voter's
estimate of the supply elasticity. Voters' beliefs on the magnitude of
a(sm) can be summarízed by a density function f. We assume f to be the same
accross voters. 11~ Since the median voter determines the election
outcome, the probabílity that the Government will be voted out before it
can implement the second part of íts gradual decontrol program equals the
probability that a(sm) ~ 0:
0
P- Pr(a~„ c 0) - f f(ai) da~ (25)
All voters use Bayes' rule to update their priors. Thus if a supply
response different from a voter's prior ís observed ín ttie fírst stage of
the program, voters revise their prior; it is straightforward to show that:
a~ -~Vaor ' (1 - i) ( YP Y" P S)
a o
- a~,r . (1 - ~) (( Y9P Y"P S) - ao~)
fl ~
(26)
with 0 ~ W G 1. ~Y determines the relative weíght of old and new information
in forming the posterior out of the príor and the likelíhood of the current
'o It is not implausible to assume that a vote early ín a major reform
program is going to be dominated by whether voters do or do not support the
program. Wíth such a single issue contest, medían voter models are thought to
be plausible descriptions of how voting mechanisms are likely to work (cf
Enelow and Hinnich ( 1984) or Hillman ( 1990)).
11 A símilar device to íntroduce uncertainty about election outcomes is
used in Alesina and Cukierman (1990).20
observation. The precise expression for i can be found in Zellner (1974)
and depends on the subjective relative variancea in the príor distribution
and the likelihood function. Note that the voter will not assume a zero
variance in the likelihood functíon for the period 1 events even though all
uncertainty in the model refers to period 2. Limited information makes him
consider only current price information ín assessing the period 1 supply
response, so he will still observe what looks to the econometricían as
positive variance, as inventory fluctuations trigger prediction errors in
his static producer model.
To assess how hoarding in period 1 12~ affects the probability of
collapae of the program of price decontrol, we need to focus on how the
updating process wíll affect f(oti). After all, while voters do not know
each other's individual preferences, they do know from each other that each
voter updates using equ. (26). With Bayesian updating, updating will shift
f(am) such that f contracts towards the voter who has a prior mean equal to
the elasticity actually observed in period 1. But the voter with zero prior
mean is more relevant, since 0 is the cut-off point for the voting
procedure.
Equ. (26) shows that the voter at 0 will shift up, down or stay where
he is depending on whether the observed supply elasticíty in períod 1 is
positive, negatíve or zero. All voters whose prior mean exceeds the supply
elasticity observed with hoarding revise their estimate of the supply
elasticity downward. Thus ff enough hoarding takes place to make the net
supply response negatíve, f shifts to the left (i.e. its mean falls) and
more weight is concentrated in the part of f defíned over (-m , 0). The
probability of collapse therefore increases if there is enough hoarding to
actually cause a net negative supply response:
A positive supply response leads to an upwards revision of aP:lo~ bY
at least all voters whose príor had a negative mean. (27) also shows that
in that case the integral of f(a,) from minus infinity to zero decreases. A
lZ More accurately, anticipated hoarding ín períod 1. Note that all
agents form rational expectatíons about all aggregate variables in the
economy.21





P(Ya-Yo-SI - P(0) ~ f (f(ao)~-f(a,~))dao
0
- f f(ao) dao
r.- .-~
rI-pe
) 0 if (Yy-Ya-S) [ 0
( 0 if (Yy-Yo-S) ) 0
(27)
downward revision of p after a negative net supply response, but an upward
revision of p after a posítive net supply response, leads to the negative
relation between p and net aggregate supply response represented by the
schedule VDS, for Voters Dissatisfaction Schedule, in Fig. 4 below.










Which way wíll this locus shift when a more gradual reform is
implemented (i.e. a smaller príce increase (Pi - Po) in period 1)7 Usíng
the expression for p(0) and differentíating (27) indicates the answer:22
d(S) f(
Yp Yp S) (Yy-Yo-S)
v o





In interpreting equ. (28), consíder again the voter with zero prior
mean first. Assume that in response to the smaller price increase enough
hoarding takes place to just offset the increase in output (which itself is
smaller than under the larger price increase). Equ. (26) indicates that the
zero príor mean voter will then once again not change his prior. This means
that after a low prlce íncrease t:he votera díssatisfactíon schedule VDS'
will go through the same poínt et zero net supply response as it will after
a high price increase (compare VDS and VDS' in Figure 4); p(0) will not be
affected.
For any given net supply response larger than zero, the same quantity
response to a smaller price change ímplies a larger elasticity and thus a
larger upward revision from any given prior. This in turn ímplies a larger
shíft to the right of the probability density function f and hence a
steeper decline in p(see the part of VDS' above 0 in Figure 4). A similar
line of reasoning applies to the case of negative supply response. Any
given negative response represents a more negative supply elasticity than
the corresponding one for the high P~ case since for the same quantitity
response the príce change is smaller. This ímplies a larger shift to the
left (downward revision of prior means) and thus a higher collapse
probability in the low P` case than in the high P~ case. All this makes for
a counterclockwíse rotation of the VDS schedule, to VDS' in Figure 4, in
response to a more gradualíst (lower P~) decontrol program. 1~~
4 Gradualism, Intertemporal Speculation and the Political Economy of
price Reform
13 Note that equ. (28), beíng a derivative, gives the response of p to
a lareer Pe.23
Wíth the two buílding blocks ( the Hoarding Schedule HS and the Voters
Dissatisfaction Schedule VDS) derived, we are ready to examine the
consequences on credibility and aggregate supply response of a gradual
price decontrol program (Fígure S below).
Hoarding, Collapse Probabllltles and Prlce Decontrol:
A Rational Expectations Equilibrium
g-YÓ
Figure 5
HS in Figure 5 indicates, for given collapse probability p, how much
producers choose to hoard. A higher collapse probability leads to lower
expected future prices and thus gives less of an incentive to hoard. The HS
locus therefore slopes up. But more hoarding lowers the perceived supply
elasticity and therefore the voters' assessment that the program is
failing; t.his in turn íncreases the probability that the Government will be
voted out. Thus the political economy schedule VDS slopes downward.
Rationalíty requires that the probability of program collapse used in
producers' hoarding decisions will indeed come out if those hoarding
decisions are in fact implemented. This will be the case at E, the24
lntersection of the Hoarding Schedule and the Voters Díssatisfaction
Schedule. Thus E represents a rational expectations equilibrium for a given
gradual decontrol policy that sets first period prices at P~ and promises
to liberalise in period 2. At pb, producers hoard Sg for a total (negatkve)
supply response Yi.E - Ya - SE. In turn, such a negative supply response
leads to a prívate revision of the collapse probabilíty that exactly
matches pE. Thus E is an internally consistent equilibrium: producers take
intertemporal decisions based on an assessment of the collapse probability
that is ín fact consistent with the likely political response to initial
reform failure given those producers decisions.
The equilibrium at E has many plausible features. Output in fact
rises, as current prices do increase.i~~ Thus the initial unemployment
costs of such a decontrol will be quite small or even absent. However, in
spite of increased output and higher prices, net supply actually reaching
the market declines as producers íncrease inventories, hoping for later
capítal gains. As a consequence, shortages develop, to the point that the
net observed supply elasticity ís ín fact negative. This in turn generates
pressure against the decontrol polícy, increasing the probabílity that the
program will have to be abandoned for a prolonged period of controls before
the final deregulation phase is reached.
Consider the consequences of a more cautious start of the program (a
lower ínitial períod level of the controls). A lower initial price, for
given collapse probability p, results in larger capital gaíns once prices
are liberalized. Thus for given p, hoarding wiil in fact increase (HS
shifts down to HS' in Figure 5. If p would not change, the new equilibrium
would be at A in Figure 5. Of course more hoarding implies a more negative
perceived supply elasticity, which in turn leads to a higher p. Thus, if
the VDS schedule ítself would not shift, a new equilíbrium would emerge at
1~ See Ortiz (1990), Bresser (1987) and Helpman (1989), covering
respectívely Mexico, Brazil and Israel. The Brazilian and Mexican
stabílization programs of respectívely 1986 and 1988 fit the assumptions made
here particularly well: there were substantíal price íncreases at the
beginning of what was announced as a temporary use of príce controls (Bresser
(1987), Ortíz (1990)).25
A', wíth more hoarding and higher collapse probabilíty: p~. ~ pg.
But there ís more: for given ~et aggregate supply response, a lower
elasticity ís implied, because it is ín response to a smaller price change;
priors thus get revised downwards more than they would under the less
gradual decontrol program and the collapse probability increases (VDS
shifts out to VDS'). Thus the new equilibrium is at E', with an
unambiguously higher probability of collapse: p`~ ~ p~~ ~ pH. Thus a more
gradual aporoach to price decontrol actuallv íncreases the collanse
nrobability.
However, although there will be an unambiguously lower output
response to more gradual decontrol (sínce the initial price is lower), the
impact on net aggregate supply is less clear. On [he one hand, there is
more hoarding for given p since the capital gain then increases; but on the
other hand there will be less hoardíng because p increasea, thus reducing
the likelihood that this larger capitnl gaín will in fact materialise. But
it ís clear from Figure 5 that the net supply response inclusive of
hoarding will remain negatíve Sf it wes so to begln with.
The same machinery can be used to assess "cold turkey" decontrol
approaches (Figure 6). Under a cold turkey approach, prices are immediately
and fully liberalized. Thus if the approach is maíntained, prices will be
market determined in both periods. Under the assumptions made, the first
period free market price P' will equal the second period price p'. Thus
without credibílity problems, there would be no hoarding, as waiting for
tomorrow will not bring higher prices to offset storage and interest costs.
Credibility problems in fact strengthen this result. If p~ 0, there
is a positive probability that second period prices will be ow than
fírst period prices, ín case controls get reimposed, which would lead to
capital osse rather than gains on inventories carried into period 2. Thus
with a"cold turkey" approach, hoarding incentives work the other way:
there are strocig distncentlves to hoard.
Therctore, if dls-hoarding would be posslble, e cold turkey approach
would lead to a very large observed net supply response, much larger than26









under gradualism. This is because in that case, if there is any credibility
problem at all, goods will in fact be pulled out of inventories, for sale
today rather than tomorrow. But dishoarding is not possible in our set-up,
sa under "cold turkey" decontrol, the case with zero inventory build up
(a - 0) will always obtain. T'hís means that the line labeled HS~~ in
Figure 6, a horizontal line at Y~~ - Yo ~ Ys - Yo ~ 0, represents the cold
turkey case. Thus the first result on the comparison between cold curkey
and gradualism: there will be no hoarding under the cold turkey apnroach.
The second clear result relates to credíbílity (the equilíbríum
value of p). Since P' 1 P~, the VDS schedule rotates further, clockwise and
still crossíng the same zero point (compare VDS~~ with VDS~ in Figure 6).
The cold turkey equilibrium is at the intersection of VDS~~ and HS~~, at
E~~. Since there is no hoarding under a cold turkey approach, there will be
a high observed supply elasticity and thus a low probability of program
collapse p~~ (lower, for example, than p(0)).
For comparison of the cold turkey decontrol strategy with a
gradualist approach, consider two possible configurations for the latter.z~
If the initial dístortion is so small that there would be no hoardíng at
all in the gradual case either (i.e. a- 0 and net supply equals Ys),
C~ t 0 would imply a smaller supply response per unit of price increase
than observed under the T approach. This in turn would imply a larger
assessed probabílity of collapse. So even if there is no hoarding under
gradualism (mild initial distortions and a- 0), gradual programs will be
less credible as cold turkey programs if C~ G 0. Moreover, since a-0 cases
have been excluded (we only consider severely distorted cases), there wíll
always be hoarding under gradualism. Therefore there is more of a downward
revision (or less of an upward revision) of the supply elasticity than in
the a- 0 case, reinforcing the result just derived for the a- 0 case. In
terms of Figure 6, HSs falls below the line Y~ - Yo at least for its inítíal
segment, and cuts VDS~ more to the right. But a lower observed supply
elasticity implies a higher likelihood of program collapse!
If a negative initial supply response obtains for at least the lower
ranges of p(HS cuts the left vertical axis below 0), the results obtain
unambiguously, for any sign of C~: since the cold turkey equilibríum is to
the left of p(0) while the gradualism equilibrium in that case is to the
right of p(0), the collapse probability under gradualism will always be
hígher, whatever the sign of C~Y is (cf Figure 6).
Thus cold turkey-orograms will unambiguously be more credible than
gradual vroerams that actuallv cause increasing shortages in their initial
phase (asa ~ n(0))~ and even if gradual vro~rams do not cause increasing
shortaees (n~s ~ 0(0)) cold turkey decontrol vrograms wíll still be more
credíble if CYYY G 0.
5 Conclusion
This paper abstracts from the question of why price controls are
used. Instead it asks a different question, one of great practical
importance. Assume that, for reasons good or bad, price controls are in
place; how should they be terminated? How to escape from a period of28
controls7 Both the coordination failure and the signaling approach suggest
at most temporary use of controls, in order to minimize output losses on
the transitíon path towards lower inflation. Should in such an approach
controls be abolished "cold turkey" or can a case be made for gradualísm?
The issue is in fact of much wíder importance; all of Eastern Europe has
been living under price controls, imposed for a very different reason. How
should countries like Poland or the USSR move towards price flexibílíty,
gradually or in a"big bang"1
Two factors complicate the issue and are at the core of thís paper.
In many cases price controls focus on commodities like basic grains,
commodities that are eminently storable and can thus be used ín
intertemporal speculation. Second, and as we will show, not unrelated,
opposition to rapid dismantling of controls is often based on claims of low
supply response, and greatly bolstered if a strong supply response indeed
fails to materialise. This is especially relevant in places líke Eastern
Europe, where experience with príce responsive markets is limited. A less
benígn argument also lends support to a línk between low supply response
and opposition to relaxing controls. Shortages create rents, and rents will
attract lobbylsts in favor of continuation of those policies that create
the rents.
We ahow the difficulties that these two factors create for gradual
decontrol of prices. We endogenise the probability of a collapse of the
reform program along the lines of the recent literature about the impact of
political considerations on economic policy (see in particular Alesína and
Cukierman (1990)) and show that such endogeneity in the presence of
intertemporal speculation leads to a strong case against gradualism. Our
core result is a forceful argument against gradual decontrol: we show that
the smaller the initial price increase is, the lower the observed supply
elasticity and the greater the probability that the program of reform wíll
in fact be abandoned.
These results imply that the policy that makes most sense from a
microeconomic point of view (decontrol immediately) is also advisable from
a macroeconomic point of view. Credíbility problems, which are at the core
of the transitional output losses that characterize most stabilization29
programs, will be much less under a cold turkey approach and so will
therefore transitional unemployment.
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Appendíx: Consumer Welfare and Price Decontrol
Consider a voter facing, as conaumer, príce decontrol.
Differentiating his budget constraint around the pre-reform sítuation leads
to a simple expression for hís welfare as a function of prices and
quantities:
~e
Eoá ó ' -AR . (P `'-Po) ~po
' -Ai' (P~-Po) a
(A.1)
For given ration síze, príce increases unambiguously owe welfare as there
is only a negative income effect. However, higher prices may increase
aggregate supply which increases welfare at given prices as long as virtual
prices exceed posted prices, hence the second term in (A.1).
(A.1) can be used to solve for the value of a at which price changes
yield no welfare impact either way, a~:
a~ - (PV-Po) (A.2)
Welfare maximizing voters will vote yes or no depending on whether their
postezior o0o is greater or smaller than n~, a~ is greater than or equal to
zero depending on whether the initial ration is greater than or equal to
zero. The size of a~ has no qualitatíve impact on any of the results as
long as it allows interior solutions (i.e. between 0 and 1) for p.Discussion Paper Series, CentER, Tilburg University, The Netherlands:
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